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THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION'S
FAIRNESS REGULATIONS: A FIRST STEP
TOWARDS CREATION OF A RIGHT
OF ACCESS TO THE MASS MEDIA
Broadcasters whose facilities are used to express one point of view
have traditionally been required to provide reply time to the opposing
point of view.1 Recently, the Federal Communications Commission
codified two aspects of this traditional "fairness doctrine"-the requirements of reply time to both personal attacks and editorial endorsements.2 A current challenge to these new regulations raises a compelling
1 The Federal Communications Commission's predecessor, the Federal Radio Commission, tried to discourage what it called "propaganda stations." See Great Lakes
Broadcasting Co., No. 4900, FEDERAL RADio COMM'N, THnD ANNUAL REPORT 32, 34-35
(1929).
The FCC's "fairness doctrine" was first crystallized in Editorializing by Broadcast
Licensees, No. 8516, 14 Fed. Reg. 3055 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Editorializing Report].
The fairness doctrine is different from the equal time provisions of the Communications
Act of 1934, § 315, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1964), which apply only to appearances by "legally
qualified" candidates.
2 47 C.F.R. § 73.123 (1968), as amended, 33 Fed. Reg. 5364 (1968):
Personal attacks; political editorials.
(a) When, during the presentation of views on a controversial issue of public
importance, an attack is made upon the honesty, character, integrity or like
personal qualities of an identified person or group, the licensee shall, within a
reasonable time and in no event later than one week after the attack, transmit to
the person or group attacked (1) notification of the date, time and identification
of the broadcast; (2) a script or tape (or an accurate summary if a script or tape
is not available) of the attack; and (3) an offer of a reasonable opportunity to
respond over the licensee's facilities.
(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this section shall not be applicable
(I) to attacks on foreign groups or foreign public figures; (2) to personal attacks
which are made by legally qualified candidates, their authorized spokesmen, or
those associated with them in the campaign, on other such candidates, their
authorized spokesmen, or persons associated with the candidate in the campaign;
and (3) to bona fide newscasts, bona fide news interviews and on-the-spot
coverage of a bona fide news event (including commentary or analysis contained
in the foregoing programs, but the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section
shall be applicable to editorials of the licensee).
(c) Where a licensee, in an editorial, (i) endorses or (ii) opposes a legally
qualified candidate or candidates, the licensee shall, within 24 hours after the
editorial, transmit to respectively (i) the other qualified candidate or candidates
for the same office or (ii) the candidate opposed in the editorial (1) notification
of the date and the time of the editorial; (2) a script or tape of the editorial;
and (3) an offer of a reasonable opportunity for a candidate or a spokesman of
the candidate to respond over the licensee's facilities: Provided, however, That
where such editorials are broadcast within 72 hours prior to the day of the
election, the licensee shall comply with the provisions of this paragraph sufficiently
far in advance of the broadcast to enable the candidate or candidates to have
a reasonable opportunity to prepare a response and to present it in a timely
fashion.
The personal attack doctrine was first promulgated in a series of proceedings in 1962.
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first amendment question. Are the regulations the unreasonable inhibition on free speech which the Seventh Circuit found them to be in
Radio Television News DirectorsAssociation v. United States;3 or are
they instead the first step towards the creation of a right of access to the
mass media? The courts should reevaluate the fairness doctrine and
emphasize its underlying purpose as a step towards recognition of true
first amendment freedom.
I
ECONOMIC MOTIVES FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE

Since both the new regulations and the fairness doctrine require
reply time only after a broadcaster has made or countenanced an initial statement, 4 the major differences between the traditional doctrine
and the regulations are in procedure, sanctions, and perhaps psychology.
Under the doctrine, the mechanics of offering reply time were discretionary with the broadcaster; the regulations, however, set definite
standards. More significantly, the Commission formerly could enforce
the doctrine only by the cumbersome and extreme sanctions of revoking
or refusing to renew a license; neither was ever done.6 Under the new
Times-Mirror Broadcasting Co., 24 P & F RADio REG. 404 (1962); Billings Broadcasting Co.,
23 P & F RADio REa. 951 (1962); Clayton W. Mapoles, 23 P & F RADIo RFG. 586 (1962). It
was developed more fully in Stations' Responsibilities Under Fairness Doctrine as to
Controversial Issue Programming, 28 Fed. Reg. 7962 (1963). The editorial endorsement
section stems directly from the Editorializing Report.
3 Radio Telev. News Dir. Ass'n v. United States, 400 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1968),
petition for cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3185 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1968) (No. 717) [hereinafter cited as
RTNDA v. United States]. The petitioners in the two companion actions were the National Broadcasting Co. and the Columbia Broadcasting System. Petitioners attempted, by
the extraordinary means of certiorari before the judgment of the Seventh Circuit, to have
their actions set down for argument with Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d
908 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 389 U.S. 968 (1967) (No. 600, 1967 Term; renumbered
No. 2, 1968 Term, 37 U.S.L.W. 3001 (1968)), which challenged the prior personal attack
doctrine on first amendment grounds. Their petition was denied, 390 U.S. 922 (1968),
but the Red Lion case was stayed until decision by the Seventh Circuit. 390 US. 916

(1968).
4 Although the Commission has sometimes intimated that a licensee has a duty to
initiate debate, Editorializing Report at 3057, a licensee can avoid controversy without
sanction. Affirmative action is required only after the broadcaster has initially taken a
position. WSOC Broadcasting Co., 17 P & F RADio RYG. 548 (1958); Jefferson Std. Broadcasting Co., 17 P & F RADIo REG. 339 (1958); Alabama Broadcasting System, Inc., 17 P & F
RADio REG. 273 (1958). A failure to handle any controversial subjects might, of course,
be taken into consideration on application for renewal. See note 56 infra.
5 Two Commissioners recently commented that "the only way in which members of the
public can prevent renewal of an unworthy station's license is to steal the document from
the wall of the station's studio in: the dead of night... ." Lamar Life Broadcasting Co.,
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regulations, however, more fexible statutory sanctions are applicable6
-perhaps indicating a real intent to enforce the regulations,
Although the regulations promote public information and fairness in controversial issues, they pose an economic threat to the industry. Slightly more than a month before promulgation of the regulations,
the Commission held that the doctrine required reply time to cigarette
commercials. 7 The spectre of Commission codification of the cigarette
ruling, its extension to other types of advertising, and its vigorous enforcement must have greatly disturbed both broadcasters and advertising men.
Broadcasters, both individually and in concert, have traditionally
avoided controversial programming because sponsors are hesitant to
become even subliminally associated with opinions disagreeable to
potential purchasers. 8 In 1939, for example, a convention of broadcasters resolved to restrict themselves in the broadcast of controversial
material.9 And when the Commission, two years later, handed down a
blanket prohibition on radio editorializing, 10 broadcasters were silent;
during the eight years that the ruling was in effect, it was never challenged."
13 P $ F RADio REr. 2d 769, 817 (196S) (Comm'rs Co

and Johnson, dissenting). Shortly

after the Lamar Life decision, and perhaps as a sop to the critics of that decision, the

Commission began a rule-making procedure relating to racial discrimination by licensees.
Nondiscrimination in Employment Practices 9f Broadcast Licensees, 33 Fed. Reg. 9960
(1968). A case which may represent. a.break with this tradition of inaction, howeyer, is
WXUR, which was designated for hearing ij Brandywine-Mainline Radio, Inc., 9 P 9: F
RADio REG. 2d 126 (1967). In that case, unlike the lamar Life case, the Broadcast Bureau
has recommended that the Commission refuse to renew the station's license. See also
Barron, The Federal Communirations Commission's Fairniess Doctrine: An vaduation, s0
QEo. WAsH. L, Rgv. 1, 19-20 (1961). The Commission's ability tQ resist political pressure
may be questionable. See Note, Regulation of ,Progrom Content By the Federal Communications Commission, 77 HAnv, L, REv, 701, 716 (1964),
Perhaps the clearest indication that the Commission has been less than effective in
enforcing the fairness doctrine is that broadcasters themselves have never been particularly disturbed over the doctrine. Hllarings on H.R. 7072, 7550, 7612 Before fhe
House Comm. On Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 195-96, 263.64
(1963) (Testimony of D, JKops, Nat'I Ass'n of Broadcasters, and F. Stanton, CBS).
6 The sanctions include cease and desist orders, criminal fines, and civil forfeitures.
47 U.S.C. §§ 312(b), 502, 03 (1964),
7 WCBS-TV, 9 P & F RADIO REG, 2d 1423, 1425 (1967), This short ruling was reaffirmed
in WCBS-TV, 11 P & V RADIo Rn-. 24 1901 (1967),
8 N. MiNow, EQUAL T mE: THE PRIVATE BROADqASTER AND THE PUBLIC INTM$r 74,76
(L. Laurent ed. 1964). Ironically, Mr, Minow is counsel for CBS in the RTNDA case.
9 L. WrrmE, TaE AMEuCAN RADIO 74-76, 245-51 (1948),
10 Mayflower Broadcasting Co., 8 FC.C, 333 (1941)t
11 But was it Constitutional? The br0oadcasters weye not disposed to find out.
After all, WAAB had been renewed, and that was the nain thing. Why ri l

losing your license just to get a case to the Supreme Court?
L. Wansm, supra note 9, at 177.
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This broadcasters acttually look to the first amendment as a guarantee of economic rather than civil rights. When a potential financial
interest is at stake, however, they are quick to raise the free speech
standard, portraying themselves as earnest educators of the public anid
the Commission as a bureaucratic and malicious censor,
Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit in News DirectorsAssociation
accepted this caricature. With a narrow outlook that mist have enraged
some members of the Commission, the court sniped: "Apparently the
Commission views programming which takes sides on a given issue to be
somehow improper. ...."1 Itseemed, in fact, sympathetic to the broadcasters' protest that "an opportunity to reply might result in the public
3
airing of obnoxious or extreme views.'1
Ii
Do THE

REGULATIONS VIoLATm THE

FItST

AMENDMENT?

There are two approaches to the fallacious argument that broad-

casting enjoys only limited first amendment protection.' 4 The firstand the only one considered by the Seventh Circuit-is based upon
some unclear comments by the Supreme Court that regulation is proper
because the number of frequencies is limited.' 5 As the Seventh Circuit
12 400 F.2d at 1014,
13 Id.
14 There is also a simplistic and specious argument that the first amendment does

not apply to radio because the Supreme Court has never directly so held. In National
Broadcasting Co, v. United States 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943), however, the Court held
that the Commission's chain broadcasting regulations did not violate the first amendment-which would seem to imply that the amendment applied to radio. The District
of Columbia Circuit seemed to read the National Broadcasting case this way in Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908, 923 (1967), cert. granted, 389 U.S. 968 (1967) (No.
600, 1967 Term; renumbered No. 2, 1968 Term, 37 U.S.L.W. 3001 (1968)). See also United
States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948) (dictum).
The Communications Act of 1934, § 326, 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1964), requires the Commission not to "interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio communication," This statute is probably contiguous with the first amendment and, accordingly, any
decision that the regulations violate the first amendment could be based on the statute,
thereby avoiding the whole constitutional issue,
15 In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943), the Court
said, "Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to all. That is
its unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject
to governmental regulation." The language of the Court might indicate that it was endorsing only the naked requirement of a license. It ended its discussion by saying, "The right
of free speech does not include, however, the right to use the facilities of radio without
a license." Id. at 227. Nevertheless, the case did uphold much more than mere licensing.
The Court approved a very complex set of regulations which, inter alia, limited the networks' ability to take away local station autonomy, id. at 200, 202, 204, 206, and which
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correctly pointed out, this "scarcity doctrine" is open to a dual challenge.16 First, as a matter of law, the dicta that gave birth to it did not
delineate the degree of allowable regulation. Second, the number of
usable frequencies has mushroomed in recent years, making possible
at least an FM or UHF allocation for anyone able to buy the basic
7
equipment.'
A second possible basis for denying or limiting first amendment
protection for broadcasting is that free speech guarantees do not attach
when the primary purpose of communication is profit.' 8 Arguably, the
advertisers' infiltration of broadcasting places the whole industry in
this category. But the "commercial purpose" doctrine has other limitations. First, the news and discussion programs on which personal attacks
and editorial endorsements are most likely to take place are often run
at a loss. Second, it is doubtful that the present Supreme Court would
find motive so determinative of first amendment rights. The Court's
recent emphasis on public issues shows that it is interested in whether
speech adds to the public debate and not in its originator's state of
mind.19
accordingly affected the actual output of local stations. Thus National Broadcasting must
be read as authorizing at least limited program control by the Commission.
It must be remembered that the Court has approved affirmative antitrust action
which probably had some effect upon speech. Cf. Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1 (1945). Almost directly in point with the fairness regulations is Lorain Journal Co.
v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951). There the Court upheld an antitrust decree which
ordered the defendant newspaper to accept advertisements from merchants who also
advertised on a local radio station. The Court relied upon the Associated Press case. Id.
at 155-56. Thus the Seventh Circuit's statement that the regulations impose burdens
"which would be in flat violation of the first amendment if applied to newspaper publishers," 400 F.2d at 1018, is highly questionable. It should also be noted that some commentators propose applying fairness-like requirements to the press. Barron, Access to the
Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1641 (1967); Note, A Fairness
DoctrineFor The Press, 40 N.D.L. Rav. 317 (1964).

16 400 F.2d at 1019.
17 id.

Limitations on VHF-TV allocations may also be seen as solely economic, since community antenna television's phenomenal growth makes it possible for any entrepreneur
to set himself up in the television business-albeit by means of a cable rather than the
airwaves.
This raises the thorny question of whether the scarcity doctrine applies to broadcasting as a whole, or only to the parts of it in which there is an existing scarcity of
frequencies. If the latter is the case, the anomalous result of holding that the FM but
not the AM part of a simultaneous AM-FM operation is protected by the first amendment may be logically demanded.
18 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964), indicates that the doctrine is still viable today.
19 See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 885 U.S. 374, 388 (1967); Brennan, The Supreme Court and
the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HAav. L. Rny. 1 (1965).
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In considering the merits of the broadcasters' first amendment
argument, the Seventh Circuit used an "unreasonable burden" test 20
which it derived from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan21 and later cases.
Although refusing to pass on the constitutionality of the traditional
fairness doctrine, 22 the court found that the regulations constituted a
greater and more constitutionally impermissible inhibition on free
speech than did the doctrine. 23 It decided first that the regulations' requirement of specific procedures for notification and granting of reply
time limited licensee discretion more than did the traditional doctrine.24 This position is questionable because the actual differences
between the doctrine and the regulations are only in procedure and
sanction. There is no significant change in the programs covered, and
the decision whether, for example, a given broadcast represents an
editorial endorsement remains within the initial judgment of the
licensee. His discretion is limited only in his actions after a positive
judgment. Prior to the regulations, questionable conduct would not
cause concern because the only available sanction was too severe for
the conduct. With the regulations, however, the broadcaster need only
25
wrestle in good faith with the question.
More significantly, the Seventh Circuit objected on two grounds
to the statutory sanctions by which the Commission could enforce the
regulations: 26 (1) that the new, wider range of sanctions made punishment more severe; and (2) that the sanctions could be imposed after a
20 400 F.2d at 1012.

21 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The regulations bear some resemblance to the statute involved
in New York Times. The Alabama libel statute there involved conditioned the plaintiff's
right to recover punitive damages upon the defendant's refusal to retract; under the
regulations, a broadcaster's failure or refusal to offer to provide reply time exposes him
to the sanctions of the Commission. This similarity, however, is somewhat misleading.
New York Times involved a staggering punitive damages award, and the most amateur
judidal-entrail reader can fairly speculate that if the Times had retracted and if plaintiff
Sullivan had recovered only nominal compensatory damages the Court would not have
viewed the Alabama judgment as such a massive inhibition on free speech.
22 400 F.2d at 1017-18.
23 Id. at 1012-18.
24 Id.

25 Amendment of Part 78 of the Rules, No. 16574, 8 F.C.C.2d 721 (1967). The Seventh
Circuit seemed to think that the good faith immunity made the rules "broader than
necessary," since it made them applicable to all licensees while punishing only those who
acted in bad faith. 400 F.2d at 1021. First, this seems to be a fairly general principle of
regulatory law. Second, the traditional fairness doctrine carries such an immunity, without
running afoul of any constitutional bar. Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the
Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415, 10416 (1964).
26 400 F.2d at 1018.
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single objectionable broadcast. But when the ohly Sanction, failure to
renew a license, amounted to economic eliminati6n, the offenses in,
volved must necessarily have been most grave. With the intfoduction

of limiited sanctions, e.g., fines of tip to one thotisand dollars pdt day
of violation,27 lesser misconduct can be punished. It is difficult to
imagine fines for violation of the regtilations giving rise tO the "virtu-

ally unlimited" liability which the Supreme Court envisaged in New
York Times.2 8 Moreover, the Commission has always had the power to

revoke a license during the term of a license for failure to comply with
the fairness doctrine.2 9 As a practical matter, of course, the promulgation of the regulations demonstrates the Commission's desire fot
sanctions which it can effectively enforce. But it is anomalous to rest

the constitutionality of a regulation on the psychology underlying its
administrative creation.

Finally, the Court held that the regulations were too vague for
licensees to follow effectively.80 Although this decision involves an element of judicial fact finding, it is also questionable. First, the regulations can be construed in the light of the many decisions under the
traditional fairness doctrine.8 ' Second, that they were promulgated for
27 C6mmunications Act of 1034, §§ 502, 503, 4P U.S.d. §§ 502, 503 (1964).
28 376 U.S, at 279.
29 The Communications Act of 1934, § 312(a)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2) (1964), empowers

the Commission to revoke a license on any grounds for which it would deny a license.
It seems reasonable, therefore, that any conduct which would justify a refusal to renew
a license would also justify license revocation.
It may, of course, be drgued that revocation of a license for such a limited course
of conduct would be so harsh as to violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
The Supreme Court has, however, never approached the question. And in the somewhat
related area of the severity of fines it has more or less given the states a free hand. See
Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86 (1909).
80 400 F.2d at 1014-17. The court did not, however, go so far as to hold the rules void
for vagueness. Rather, it rested its argument on the self-censoring potential of vague laws
in first amendment areas.
It would be difficult to make out a case that the regulations are void for vagueness;
they are at least reasonably comprehensible and a violation does not lead to criminal
sanctions. See Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1951). The court noted
that while any vague laws are unconstitutional, those involving first amendment rights
receive special scrutiny. 400 F.2d at 1011, citing Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200
(1966). Arguably the vagueness doctrine applies to administrative regulations imposing
non-criminal liability because it applies to statutes imposing such liability. Boutilier v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 38 U.S. 118, 123 (1967). Otherwse it does not apply
at all.
81 Cases cited note
supra. While the administrative agency cases are hardly binding
on the Seventh Circuit, they must contain tome lessons for both broadcasters and their
counsel. Moreover, so long as the fairness doctrine is not uprooted by the Supreme Court,
cases applying its substance wil be directly relevant to these succ6ssof regulation§.
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the explicit purpose of clarifying the traditional fairness dqctrine gives rise to at least an inference of definiteness. Third, although the
Seventh Circuit attempted to demonstrate possible theoretical ambiguities in the regulations, it did not suggest how they could be made
more definite, In fact, attempting to break clown the word "character,"
for example, into various categories-e.g., treatment of family, generosity, sexual attitudes-would not appreciably increase the word's definitene~s. More seriously, it would create loopholes which would vitiate
the whole purpose of the regulations. The complex and continually
changing nature of expreission seems to make any such attempt inherently impossible. Finally, the Court's assertion that a licensee "will
engage in [more] rigorous self-censorship
than if he were subject
only to the Fairness Doctrine"3 3 seems completely wrong. Any marginal
increase in self-censorship will be a function nQt of the substance of the
regulations but rather of the sanctions for noncompliance, In other
words, although the Seventh Circuit explicitly eschewed the question
of the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine, it effectively held the
concept of fairness-plus-sanction unconstitutional. No one was especially disturbed about a fairness doctrine which carried an overkill
punishment, but when the same rules were mated with realistic punishments, the rules themselves suddenly became a first amendment
threat.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the opinion is the manner in
which it offers up its reasoning for a sacrificial reversal by the Supreme
Court. Juxtaposed with the holding of unconstitutionality based on
vagueness, the burden on the licensee, and the potential for censorship,
is the afterthought that the rules could be sustained on a showing of
both public necessity and inability to draw "less restrictive and oppressive" regulations.84 Although the Seventh Circuit did not believe that
the Commission had demonstrated the existence of either factor, this
appears to be a reversible conclusion of law. The court's confusion
becomes apparent when it demands that the Commission demonstrate
"ea significant public interest in the attainment of fairness in broadcasting,"3' 5 but finds that there is no evidence of the "existence of widespread noncompliance,",Q The court, in condemning the regulations,
confused the existence of a legitimate public interest with its determina32

32 Fed, Reg.

10,305

(1968).

33 400 F.2d at 1016 (footnote omitted).
34 Id. at 1020.

3 Id.
Id. at 1Q21.

3
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tion that the regulations were unnecessary; public interest and necessity
can exist quite independently of each other.
In fact, the regulations advance first amendment goals as freshly
defined by New York Times and later cases emphasizing the public's
need to hear debate on public issues.3 7 The regulations, without forcing
the broadcaster to initiate discussion, require him at least to give reply
time to an opposing point of view-even if that view is "obnoxious or
extreme." And it was a forceful reply, rather than a suit for damages,
which the Supreme Court in New York Times endorsed as the best way
to assuage the sting of a damaging statement.3 8 Further, under New
York Times a defendant can be liable only in the presence of actual
malice; under the regulations, a licensee will be sanctioned only in the
absence of good faith. In neither case is a good faith action penalized.
Thus the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that the regulations represent
an unreasonable burden under New York Times appears to be erroneous.
III
DOES

THE

FIRST AMENDMENT REQUIRE REGULATION
OF ACCESS TO BROADCAST MEDIA?

The first argument in favor of constitutionally mandated regulations is that the government has an affirmative duty to correct a broadcaster's discrimination between competing points of views because such
discrimination is imputable to the government. There are three closelyrelated bases for making such an imputation: that the sovereign owns
the airwaves; 39 that broadcasting is a governmental activity analogous
to the Post Office; 40 and that the granting of a license constitutes gov37 By their very terms the regulations operate only in the context of public issues.
47 C.F.R. § 73.123(a) (1968) is restricted to "controversial issues," and § 73.123(c) applies
only to elections-which are certainly public issues.
38 376 U.S. at 304-05. Although the broadcasters

claimed that the regulations were
as inhibiting as the absolute ban on newspaper editorials which the Supreme Court struck
down in Mills v. Alabama, 884 U.S. 214 (1966), Brief for Petitioner RTNDA at 81, RTNDA
v. United States, they provide precisely that which the Court found to be the "fatal flaw"
of the Mills statute-a right of reply. 884 U.S. at 220.
39 See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Sta., 809 U.S. 470, 475 (1940). See also Communications Act of 1984, §§ 801, 309(h), 47 U.S.C. §§ 801, 309(h) (1964). The recently-passed
Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, 47 U.S.C.A. § 899 (Supp. 1968), forbids editorializing on
publicly-subsidized, noncommercial, educational stations.
40 In Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 827 U.S. 146 (1946), and Public Clearing House v.
Coyne, 194 U.S. 497 (1904) (dictum), the Court said that the Post Office could not deny
mailing privileges to disapproved literature. It is interesting to note that in Esquire
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ernment action inhering in private acts of the licensee. 41 All three
theories support the same conclusion-that radio and television stations
operate only by the grace of Congress.
A more realistic, albeit more revolutionary, approach is that the
first amendment requires a right of access for, or, correlatively, a duty
to present, all points of view on public issues. 42 The rationale behind
the first amendment is that the people should be exposed to the full
spectrum of opinion on the important issues of the day. 4 In the past,
freedom from government oppression may have been enough to guarantee this exposure, 44 but something more is needed today. The mass
media have a mass orientation. 45 Consequently, they indulge in a form
of mercenary self-censorship, that is probably as thorough a prior restraint as a bishop's imprimatur.46 In this situation, greater protection
for the mass media would more firmly entrench an unacceptable status
quo. 47 What is needed, instead of any absolute right of free speech, is
an affirmative right of access to the media.
Thus far, the Supreme Court has not approached the issue. 48 But
New York Times and later cases show the Court's increasing concern
Justice Frankfurter concurred in order to point out the possible affirmative constitutional
mandate in the Court's decision. 327 U.S. at 159.
41 Justice Douglas has provided a few lone comments to the effect that licensing an
activity cloaks it with state action. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 385 (1967) (concurring); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 281-83 (1963) (concurring); Garner v.
Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 182-84 (1961) (concurring).
42 For two groundbreaking and thorough studies of this proposition, see 2 Z. CsIFE,
GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 471-719 (1947); Barron, Access To The PressA New First Amendment Right, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1641 (1967).

Would there be any objection to a single point of view if it really
was the truth?
MILTON: Do you mean, would we object to God's owning all the newspapers and
radio stations?
PLATO: According to the doctrine of free will, even this would be bad.
2 CHAru., supra note 42, at 596. Cf. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
Accordingly a function of free speech under our system of government is to
invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs
people to anger.
43 XENOPHON:

Id. at 4.

2 CHnAvE, supra note 42, at 473.
Barron, supra note 42, at 1646.
46 See pp. 296-97 supra.
44
45

47 Barron, supra note 42, at 1651-52.
48 Except, of course, insofar as it has held that government action insuring access

is not itself violative of the first amendment. See note 15 su*a. The District of Columbia
Circuit seemed to split over this issue in Red Lion Broadcasting, Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908,
930 (1967), cert. granted, 389 U.S. 968 (1967) (No. 600, 1967 Term; renumbered No. 2,
1968 Term, 37 U.S.L.W. 3001 (1968)).
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with the public's right to hear debate on controversial issues, 49 With

the public issue concept as a starting point, it is a politically giaht, but
doctrinally short, step to the conclusion that the publie'9 right to hear
is meaningless unless implemented by a right of access.5

IV
BEYOND THE FAMNEss DOCTRINE
Although the FCC was the first governmental agency to take action
toward implementing a right of access, 51 it has gone only part wayinitial action by the broadcaster is still necessary to activate the fairness
doctrine. First amendment rights, however, should not be left to the
discretion of businessmen. The present regulations' standard of an
initial personal attack or editorial should be replaced by a constitutional standard of public issue. Instead of being obligated only to provide reply time, broadcasters should be required to seek out and present

differing positions on public issues. Such a requirement is, admittedly,
nebulous. What is a public issue? What efforts to seek out differing
opinions are required? Who shall present these opinions? How much
time must be provided for given issues and opinions? When must the
time be provided?
As in the traditional fairness doctrine, however, some uncertainty
is necessary because of the many different factual situations that will
arise. And also, as in the fairness doctrine, both administrative convenience and factual complexity require that great weight be placed
upon the good faith efforts of licensees. Because licensees may make
good faith mistakes, an access requirement should not be codified and
enforced against individual failures to present debate.6 Rather, any
consistent failure by the licensee to present debate should be determined
49 In Time, Inc, V. Hill, 385 U.S. 874, 388 (1967), the Court seemed to emphasize the
need of the public to hear debate on certain issues. That the Court today is oriented more
towards the public's right to hear than the individual's right to say something is ittdicated
by its seeming adoption of the Meiklejohn public issue concept. See Brennan, sup'ra note
19. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); Lamont v. Postmaster
Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).
50 Access to media may be in the nature of a "penumbral right," since without it
the goal of the first amendment cannot be completely fulfilled. See Griswold v. Conhiecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
51 The Commission has long recognized the right of the public to be informed: "It
is this right of the public to be informed ... which is the foundation stone of the
American system of broadcasting." Editoralizing Report, supa note i, at 3056.
b2 The Commission might, of course, codify an access requirement but enfofcb the
statutory sanctions only on the basis of an extended course of conduet,
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on. renew4a after ail exgamnation Of his whoe course of conduct during
the license period. 53
The Supreme Court has made vague motions towards a first amendmeint right of access, and commentators have openly advocated it, The
Commission, however, could implement an access right without finding a constitutional mandate. The Communications Act requires the
Commission to tae the public interest into account when renewing
licenses,54 and the Commission has long held that a licensee's service
to his community is an integr4 factor in such a determination,5 5 Thus,
an examination of whether the broadcaster has presented the full scope
of opinion on current public issues would merely entail a more vigorous application of present policies, Arguably, such a requirement leaves
too much to the whim of the FCC,56 but the Commission's action is
reviewable. The power of the mass media carries a correlative responsibility, Unfortunately, mercenary self-censorship has led to an
abdication of that responsibility, When the private sector turns censor,
it is time to trust the public.
Michael Botein
The Commission appears divided as to whether a licensee's conduct after his
renewal application has been designated for hearing is relevant to the renewal determination. Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 13 P & F RADio REG. 2d 769 (1968).
54 47 U.S.C. §§ 807(a), 309 (1964).
55 Network Programming Inquiry, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291, 7295 (1960).
56 The Seventh Circuit reflected a fear that the Commission might, through subjective interpretation of the regulations, censor those views with which it did not agree.
400 F.2d at 1010. Though such conduct is, of course, within the realm of possibility, it
would be an indirect means of censorship-and no greater than that accorded to individual judges who adminiqter the New York Times rule. Both can be reViewed if they
abuse their power.
Furthermore, the Commission has always shied away frqm looking to the merits of
program content. In Station KTYM, 9 P 8: F Rtqio ,Ra, . 2d 271 (1967), the Commission
refused to deny a license renewal on the ground o alleged "hate" programs. Its emphasis
on good faith 41so xeftects an 4ttempt not to loo at prognm content.
53

